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WHEN IS A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY INTEREST IN 
COMMON lAW JURISDICTIONS AN ASSET OF ONE 
SPOUSE?: CRAFT-ING A SOLUTION FOR THE TAX 
CODE'S § 108 INSOLVENCY EXCLUSION 
Kimberly A. Butlakt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gross income for purposes of federal income tax consists of income 
from all sources derived, including income from discharge of indebt-
edness. 1 Discharge of indebtedness is considered income because a 
debt does not have to be repaid once it is discharged, even though the 
debtor received the beneficial use of the funds. 2 Over time courts 
have held that a debtor has no taxable income from the discharged 
debt.3 This practice-recognizing that an insolvent debtor whose 
debt is discharged receives nothing of exchangeable value-became 
known as the judicial insolvency exception.4 When determining insol-
vency under this exception, courts disregarded proFerty that was pro-
tected under state law from creditors' claims because the creditor 
discharging the debt could not seize it; therefore, this property was 
not considered an asset of the debtor.5 
In the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 ("BTA 1980"), Congress codified 
the judicial insolvency exception in § 108 of the Internal Revenue 
Code ("Code").6 Section 108, now the exclusive insolvency excep-
t Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown 
University Law Center (2002); J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law 
(2001). 
1. LR.C. § 61(a)(12) (West 2004); see al50 Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531 U.S. 206, 213 
(2001). Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. LR.C. §§ 1-9833 (West 2004). 
2. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). The rule of Kirby 
Lumber, in which the Supreme Court held that a debtor realized "an acces-
sion to income" where "assets previously offset by the obligation ... now 
extinct" became available, is codified in LR.C. § 61(a)(12). See id.; see also 
infra Part ILA (discussing the inclusion of discharged debt in taxable 
income). 
3. See, e.g., Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70 F.2d 95, 
96 (5th Cir. 1934). 
4. See infra Part ILB (discussing the judicial insolvency exception). 
5. See Cole v. Comm'r, 42 B.TA. 1110, 1113 (1940). Insolvency results when 
the debtor's liabilities exceed his assets. LR.C. § 108(d)(3) (West 2004). 
See also infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text (discussing Dallas Transfer); 
infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Cole and its progeny). 
6. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 [hereinafter BTA 1980], Pub. L. No. 96-589, 
§ 2, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980); see also S. REp. No. 96-1035, at 7-8 nn.1, 2 (1980), 
287 
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tion/ allows a debtor to exclude a discharged debt from income if his 
or her liabilities exceed the fair market value of his or her assets. 8 It 
was not until a few years ago, however, that a court considered 
whether property protected by state law from creditors' claims is con-
sidered an asset under § 108, or whether it is disregarded-as it had 
been under the judicial insolvency exception. 
In 2001, the United States Tax Court considered this issue in Carl-
son v. Commissioner.9 The court concluded that unlike the judicial in-
solvency exception, property protected under state law from creditors' 
claims was not disregarded when determining insolvency under § 108.10 
In light of Carlson, a question remains as to what type of property-
which, until then, had been disregarded-is considered an asset 
under § 108. In particular, a question arises as to whether property 
titled as tenants by the entirety is considered an asset when determin-
ing a debtor-spouse's insolvency. 
In 2002, the Supreme Court took a step toward answering this ques-
tion in United States v. Craft. I I Although Craft did not involve a 
debtor's insolvency, the opinion is instructive because the Court ex-
haustively analyzed the indicia of ownership of a tenancy by the en-
tirety interest. 12 The issue in Craft was whether a federal tax lien could 
attach to one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest. I3 In consider-
ing the issue, the Court looked at the actual rights (and not merely 
state law labels) the debtor-spouse had in his tenancy by the entirety 
interest, and determined that he had property or rights to property.I4 
More specifically, the Court held that, despite the protections af-
forded under state law, a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety inter-
est constituted property or a right to property upon which a federal 
tax lien could attach, although the tax was owed by only one spouse. I5 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 7017; infra Part II.C (discussing the codifica-
tion of the judicial insolvency exclusion). 
7. I.R.C. § 108(e) (1). 
8. I.R.C. § 108(a)(I)(B), (d) (3). This article focuses on the issues of which 
property is considered an asset of a taxpayer and what the asset's associated 
value is for purposes of the § 108 insolvency calculation. The issue of what 
is a liability under § 108 was addressed by the United States Tax Court in 
Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 463 (1997). The court held that in order for a 
contingent debt obligation to be a liability under § 108, the taxpayers must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they would be called upon 
to pay the obligation in an amount less than their full exposure. Id. at 475-
76. 
9. 116 T.C. 87 (2001). 
10. Id. at 105-06; see also infra Part III (discussing Carlson). 
11. 535 U.S. 274 (2002). 
12. See infra Part IV (discussing Craft). 
13. Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. 
14. See id. at 283-88. 
15. Id. at 288. 
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The Court, however, remanded the issue of valuation of the debtor-
spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest.16 
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Craft and the Tax 
Court's holding in Carlson, a cogent argument can be made that a 
tenancy by the entirety interest is considered an asset under § lOS 
when a debt of only one spouse is discharged. This situation is illus-
trated by the following example. 
Assume Paul and Mary are husband and wife who own their house 
as tenants by the entirety in a traditional common law jurisdiction, 
such as Maryland.17 Paul, alone, takes out a $100,000 loan for his bus-
iness. The business subsequently fails and the full amount of the loan 
is discharged. This discharged debt is income, as it is an accession to 
wealth. If, immediately before Paul's debt is discharged, he has liabili-
ties of $250,000 and assets with a fair market value of $360,000 (in-
cluding the value of the house), then he is solvent to the extent of 
$110,000. Accordingly, the entire discharged debt is includible in 
Paul's income. Should the house he owns with Mary as tenants by the 
entirety be considered an asset, although the debt discharged was not 
marital debt and despite the protections afforded to tenancy by the 
entirety property under state law? If so, what should be the value of 
Paul's interest in the house? 
To analyze this issue, this article first sets forth the origin and devel-
opment of the judicial insolvency exception and the codification of 
the exception in § 10S.18 Second, this article reviews the Tax Court's 
analysis in Carlson of exempt property as enhancing a debtor's ability 
to pay.19 Third, this article discusses the Supreme Court's rationale 
for holding that a federal tax lien can attach to a tenancy by the en-
tirety interest although only one spouse owes the tax, and despite the 
state law ownership restrictions (and resulting protections) associated 
with tenancy by the entirety property.20 Fourth, this article analyzes 
the rights and restrictions of a tenancy by the entirety interest in a 
traditional common law jurisdiction such as Maryland.21 Based on the 
discussion of the foregoing, the article concludes that a tenancy by the 
entirety interest should be considered an asset under § lOS. 22 
The focus of this article then shifts to address the conundrum of 
determining the fair market value of a present interest in one spouse's 
tenancy by the entirety interest. This article reviews how courts have 
valued one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest post-CraJf3 and 
16. See id. at 289. 
17. This example will be used passim to illustrate the concepts and develop-
ment of the law described in this article. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra Part V.A. 
22. See infra Part V.B. 
23. See infra Part Vl.B. 
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how this interest is valued by the IRS in collection proceedings.24 
Next, this article considers the Code's statutory formula for valuing a 
tenancy by the entirety interest for estate tax purposes.25 Then, be-
cause the value of one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest may be 
impacted as a result of divorce, this article reviews the potential effect 
of marital dissolution law in an equity jurisdiction (where property is 
divided based on the equities of the relationship, rather than equally), 
such as Maryland.26 This article concludes that a debtor-spouse's ten-
ancy by the entirety interest should be valued by assigning each 
spouse a value in his or her respective interest that is half of the net 
asset value of the underlying property.27 The value should then be 
adjusted, when appropriate, based on the facts and circumstances, 
particularly those that would affect valuation in a marital dissolution 
proceeding or valuation of a survivorship interest.28 
II. GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY 
EXCLUSION 
A. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.: Discharged Debt Included in 
Income 
Discharged debt was first included in gross income in United States v. 
Kirby Lumber CO. 29 Kirby Lumber arose around the time of the first 
Texas oil boom.30 John Henry Kirby, a Houston pioneer, sold large 
tracts of pine forest to Houston Oil Company but kept the timber and 
organized the Kirby Lumber Company to cut it down.31 The company 
issued bonds at par value and later purchased some of those bonds for 
less than par value. 32 The exchange resulted in a return of 
$137,521.30 to the company.33 In its one-page opinion, the Court 
held that this amount was an accession to wealth to the company that 
must be considered when calculating gross income.34 The Court rea-
soned that the company had "no shrinkage of assets and [it] made a 
clear gain. As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 
[in] assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct."35 
24. See infra Part VI.C. 
25. See infra Part VI.D. 
26. See infra Part VI.E. 
27. See infra Part VII. 
28. See infra Part VII. 
29. 284 U.S. 1 (1931). 
30. Deborah H. Schenk, The Story of Kirby Lumber: The Many Faces of Discharge of 
Indebtedness Income, in TAX STORIES 97 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003). 
31. [d. 
32. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 2. 
33. [d. 
34. See id. at 3. 
35. [d. 
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The rule of Kirby Lumber that discharge of indebtedness is income to 
the debtor was codified in § 61 (a)(12).36 
B. Judicial Insolvency Exception 
Shortly after Kirby Lumber, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit created a judicial insolvency exception in Dallas 
Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner.37 As in Kirby Lum-
ber, the debtor in Dallas Transferwas a Texas company-in this case, a 
corporation engaged in the transfer and storage business.38 The cor-
poration owed $107,880.77 to its landlord.39 Because the corporation 
was insolvent, the landlord accepted partial payment of $17,507.20 on 
the debt and canceled the rest. 40 
When determining whether the discharged debt was income to the 
insolvent corporation, the court compared the cancellation of the 
debt to what occurs in an insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding, 
whereby a debtor is discharged from liability for its debts.41 In such a 
proceeding, the debtor does not acquire something of exchangeable 
value in addition to what he had before: there is a reduction or extin-
guishment of liabilities without any increase of assets; there is an ab-
sence of gain or profit, as required to be considered income.42 The 
court recognized that a discharged insolvent or a bankrupt individual 
or entity would not have taxable income in the amount that the debts 
exceed surrendered assets.43 Similarly, a discharged debt that left a 
debtor insolvent was not income.44 The debtor has no increase in 
assets as a result of the discharge and, therefore, received no gain or 
profit. 45 
The court concluded: "A transaction whereby nothing of exchange-
able value comes to or is received by a taxpayer does not give rise to or 
create taxable income."46 As a result of Dallas Transfer, an exception 
to Kirby Lumber was created whereby a debtor remaining insolvent af-
ter a debt was discharged does not recognize the discharged debt as 
income. 
The judicial insolvency exception was refined a few years later in 
Lakelcnd Grocery Co. v. Commissioner.47 In Lakeland Grocery, the Board of 
Tax Appeals extended the rationales of Kirby Lumber and Dallas Trans-
36. Seel.R.C. § 61 (a)(12) (West 2004). 
37. 70 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1934). 
38. Id. at 95. 
39. See id. at 95-96. 
40. See id. at 96. 
41. Id. 
42. See id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. 
47. 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937). 
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fer and held that the discharged debt was excluded from income only 
to the extent of the debtor's insolvency.48 The debtor, a Florida cor-
poration, could not pay its debts. Mter the debts were discharged, it 
was solvent to the extent of $39,596.93.49 The court recognized that a 
debtor would not have taxable income from a discharged debt if the 
debtor was insolvent after the discharge.5o In this case, however, at 
the time the debt was discharged, the corporation's assets exceeded its 
liabilities.51 Because the corporation was solvent, the court held that 
it had taxable income to the extent that the discharged debt resulted 
in its solvency. 52 
Several years after its decision in Lakeland Grocery, the Board of Tax 
Appeals added another layer of analysis to the judicial insolvency ex-
ception in Cole v. Commissioner. 53 Rufus Cole, the petitioner-debtor, 
was a corporate executive who became heavily indebted to brokers.54 
His employer advanced $101,830 to him, and later discharged $63,000 
of that amount. 55 When determining the extent to which Mr. Cole's 
liabilities exceeded his assets (and thus, the extent of his insolvency), 
the Board of Tax Appeals disregarded assets exempt under state law 
from creditors' claims-in this case, the value of Mr. Cole's equity in 
ten insurance policies. 56 Without much analysis, the board based its 
decision on the fact that the policies were excluded from creditors' 
claims under New York law.57 Presumably, the board did so because 
these assets were never released from the employer-creditor's reach, 
as it could never attach an interest in them. For the next forty years, 
assets exempt under state law from creditors' claims were disregarded 
48. Id. at 292. 
49. Id. at 29l. 
50. See id. 
51. Id. at 292. 
52. See id.; see also Haden Co. v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1941) 
(holding that a debtor must include discharged debts in income to the 
extent that the debtor became solvent as a result of the discharge because 
the discharge is an accession to income in that year); cf Quinn v. Comm'r, 
31 B.T.A. 142, 145 (1934) (holding that the cancellation of a mortgage 
where the debtor remained insolvent did not result in taxable income be-
cause assets did not become available). 
53. 42 B.T.A. 1110 (1940). 
54. Id. at 1110. 
55. Id. at 111O-1l. 
56. Id. at 1113. 
57. Id. at 1112-13. As authority for this holding, the Board of Tax Appeals cited 
an old case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See id. at 1113 (cit-
ing Underleak v. Scott, 134 N.W. 731 (Minn. 1912». In Under-leak, the 
court considered whether a transfer of property by a debtor to his daughter 
was a fraudulent conveyance under state law, which would avoid the convey-
ance under the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898. 134 N.W. at 731-32. The 
court held that whether a debtor was deemed "insolvent" under § 1 of the 
Bankruptcy Act should be decided according to state law, and disposed of 
the case on the basis that exempt property of the debtor should not be 
considered in determining solvency. See id. at 734. 
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when determining insolvency under the judicial insolvency 
exception.58 
The development of the judicial insolvency exception can be sum-
marized with the following principles. A discharged debt is consid-
ered income to the debtor,59 but it is not taxed to the extent that the 
debtor is insolvent after the discharge.6o When determining insol-
vency, property protected under state law from creditors' claims is dis-
regarded as an asset of the debtor.61 
These principles are illustrated by returning to the example in the 
Introduction. 62 Remember that in the example, Paul has liabilities of 
$250,000 and assets of $360,000. Assume that his assets include his 
ownership interest in a house in Maryland and that the underlying 
fair market value of the (entire) property is $300,000. Paul owns this 
house with his wife, Mary, as tenants by the entirety. A $100,000 debt 
of Paul's (alone) is discharged. Under the judicial insolvency excep-
tion, Paul has $100,000 of income from the discharged debt. Whether 
and to what extent that $100,000 is taxable income to Paul depends 
on whether and to what extent he is insolvent, which is determined by 
subtracting his liabilities from the fair market value of his assets. 
Under the judicial insolvency exception, only $60,000 of his assets are 
considered because the house he owns as a tenant by the entirety is 
exempt under state law from claims of his creditors.63 Therefore, Paul 
is insolvent to the extent of $190,000-$250,000 of liabilities less 
$60,000 of assets. Consequently, none of the $100,000 discharged 
debt is includible in his income. 
C. Codification oj the Judicial Insolvency Exception in the Bankruptcy Tax 
Act oj 1980 
Congress largely codified the judicial insolvency exception in § 108 
in the BTA 1980.64 This legislation, which was part of bankruptcy law 
58. See, e.g., Davis v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 814, 833-34 (1978) (disregarding the 
value of a homestead exemption, an automobile, an insurance policy, cloth-
ing, and jewelry when determining insolvency because that property was 
exempt from creditors' claims under state law); Hunt v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 919,948 (1989) (disregarding the value of a homestead exemption 
and certain personal property); Estate of Marcus v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 39, 41 (1975) (disregarding life insurance policies); Babin v. 
Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1357, 1366 (1992) (disregarding a checking ac-
count balance of less than $400, the cash value from a life insurance policy, 
the value of an automobile, and apparel and household items to the extent 
of $200 per item). 
59. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
62. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
64. See Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 3389 (1980). Prior to its amendment 
by the BTA 1980, the statutory exclusion of discharge of indebtedness was 
limited to debt incurred in business. See S. REp. No. 96-1035 (1980), re-
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reform, set forth tax rules applicable to debts discharged in bank-
ruptcy, as well as to insolvent debtors who do not go through bank-
ruptcy proceedings.65 
Specifically, the BTA 1980 provided that if a debtor is insolvent, any 
debt discharged is excluded from income to the extent of the debtor's 
insolvency.66 But in order for the debt to be excluded, the debtor 
must reduce his or her tax attributes in other property.67 When re-
ducing tax attributes, a debtor may elect to reduce basis in deprecia-
ble property or in real property held as inventory; otherwise, he or she 
must reduce net operating losses, certain tax credits, basis in other 
property, and capital loss carryovers.68 The legislative history of the 
BTA 1980 makes clear that a primary purpose of § 108 is to ensure 
that the discharged debt is eventually treated as ordinary income (and 
therefore subject to tax). 69 
printed in 19S0 U.S.C.CAN. 7017. Further, discharged debt was excluded 
only to the extent that basis was reduced. See id. There are no similar limi-
tations in the current discharge of indebtedness exclusion. See id. at 7035. 
65. SeeS. REP. No. 96-1035, at 2,15 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0 U.S.C.CAN. 7017, 
7030. Section lOS also excludes discharged debts that are qualified farm 
indebtedness and qualified real property indebtedness. I.R.C. 
§ 10S(a) (1)(C) & (D) (West 2004). 
66. IRC. § lOS(a)(3); seeS. REp. No. 96-1035, at 2,15 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0 
U.S.C.CAN. 7017, 7030. 
67. I.R.C. § 10S(b)(1); seeS. REp. No. 96-1035, at 2,15 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0 
U.S.C.CAN. 7017, 7017-1S, 7030. 
6S. I.R.C. § 10S(b) (2). A debtor may elect to first apply any portion of the 
discharged debt to reduce basis in depreciable property. [d. at § 10S(b) (5). 
If the debtor does not so elect, § lOS requires the debtor to reduce tax 
attributes in the following order: (1) net operating losses, both in the year 
of the discharge and any carryovers to that year; (2) carryovers to or from 
the taxable year relating to general business credits under § 3S; (3) mini-
mum tax credits under § 53(b) as of the beginning of the year immediately 
following the discharge; (4) net capital losses under § 1212; (5) basis of 
property of the taxpayer; (6) passive activity losses and credit carryovers 
under § 469(b) in the year of the discharge; and (7) foreign tax credit car-
ryovers under § 27. [d. at § 10S(b)(2). A debtor's reduction of basis in 
property in number (5) applies to essentially all property the debtor owns, 
including" [p] roperty not used in a trade or business nor held for invest-
ment." Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1 (a) (5) (2003). Presumably, the basis of prop-
erty owned by the debtor and his spouse as tenants by the entirety does not 
fall within this category because it is considered owned by a marital unit 
and not by either spouse individually. Analysis of this issue is analogous to 
the analysis of whether a tenancy by the entirety interest is an asset of the 
debtor-spouse. Section lOS and the Treasury Regulation should be inter-
preted either to consider a debtor's tenancy by the entirety interest as an 
asset in determining insolvency or to reduce the basis in a debtor's tenancy 
by the entirety interest. The focus and conclusion of this article, however, 
is that a tenancy by the entirety interest should be considered an asset of 
the debtor-spouse. A discussion of ownership interests for basis reduction 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
69. S. REp. No. 96-1035, at 2-3, 10-11 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0 U.S.C.CAN. 
7017, 701S, 7025-26; see also Info. Ltr. 2004-0125 (July 2S, 2004). 
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III. CARLSON V. COMMISSIONER: EXEMPT ASSETS INCLUDED 
IN INSOLVENCY DETERMINATION 
More than twenty years after codification of the judicial insolvency 
exception, the United States Tax Court (the successor to the Board of 
Tax Appeals) heard Carlson v. Commissioncr.70 In Carlson, the court 
considered whether property protected under state law from credi-
tors' claims should be disregarded when determining insolvency 
under § 108, as it had been under the judicial insolvency exception. 71 
Mter examining the plain language of § 108 and reviewing its legisla-
tive history, the court held that, unlike the judicial insolvency excep-
tion, property exempt under state law from creditors' claims was not 
disregarded when determining insolvency under § 108.72 
The facts of Carlson are relatively simple. Roderick Carlson, a com-
mercial fisherman, and his wife Jeanette purchased a fishing vessel 
with funds borrowed from a bank.73 Later, the couple became delin-
quent in their loan payments and the bank foreclosed on the vesse1.74 
The bank reduced the balance of the loan with the foreclosure pro-
ceeds and discharged the remaining balance.75 As a result, $42,142 of 
the debt was discharged.76 Mter concluding that their liabilities ex-
ceeded the fair market value of their assets, the debtors excluded this 
amount from their taxable income pursuant to § 108.77 
Although the debtors had a commercial fishing permit, they ex-
cluded the permit as an asset when calculating their insolvency be-
cause it was exempt under state law from creditors' claims.78 As a 
result, the court had to determine whether assets that would have 
been disregarded under the judicial insolvency exception were also 
disregarded under § 108.79 
The court held that the word "assets," as used to determine insol-
vency under § 108, included property exempt under state law from 
creditors' claims.80 Before reaching this conclusion, the court recog-
nized that the word "assets" was not defined in § 108 or the regula-
tions thereunder, and that its dictionary definition supported more 
than one construction.8! Consequently, the court determined that 
the meaning of "assets" was ambiguous and required further delibera-
70. 116 T.e. 87 (2001). 
71. [d. at 88. 
72. [d. at 106. 
73. [d. at 88-89. 
74. [d. at 89. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. at 89-90. 
78. [d. at 90, 92. The commercial fishing permit had a fair market value of 
$393,400. [d. at 92. 
79. [d. at 101. 
80. [d. at 105. 
81. See id. at 93-94. 
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tion.82 Mter reviewing the legislative history of the insolvency excep-
tion, the court concluded: 
Congress did not intend to exclude assets exempt from the 
claims of creditors under applicable State law from a tax-
payer's assets for purposes of determining whether the tax-
payer is insolvent within the meaning of section 10S(d) (3). 
If Congress had intended to exclude such exempt assets 
from a taxpayer's assets in determining whether the taxpayer 
is insolvent for purposes of section lOS, Congress would have 
so stated in section 10S(d) (3). It did not.83 
The court then looked at the couple's ability to pay tax on the dis-
charged liability, recognizing that if the couple's total assets exceed 
their liabilities, then the debtors have "the ability to pay an immediate 
tax on income from discharged indebtedness."84 The court con-
cluded that the fishing permit did enhance the debtors' ability to pay, 
despite its protection under state law.85 Therefore, the court held 
that the fishing permit was an asset for purposes of determining insol-
vency under § 1OS.86 Accordingly, under § lOS, property exempt 
under state law from creditors' claims is not disregarded as an asset. 
In defining assets based on the debtors' ability to pay-rather than 
on what the debtors' creditor could seize-the court expanded the 
scope of what is considered an asset. The definition makes sense be-
cause the court was determining the couples' tax rather than their 
ability to repay the debt. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the credi-
tor could seize the property. This conclusion finds support in at least 
two legal principles: first, exclusions from taxable income are con-
strued narrowly;87 second, the IRS is empowered with authority that 
gives it greater rights than a typical unsecured creditor.88 
The holding of Carlson left open the question of what other types of 
property, disregarded under the judicial insolvency exclusion, are 
considered assets under § lOS. One type is property titled as tenants 
82. See id. at 93. 
83. [d. at 104. 
84. [d. at 105. 
85. [d. at 104-05. 
86. [d. at 105. The holding in Carlson is consistent with the latest position of 
the IRS, which considers property exempt under state law from creditors' 
claims as an asset for the purpose of determining insolvency. This position 
is a sea-change from the Internal Revenue Service's earlier position, and is 
based on the rationale that excluding exempt assets would allow economi-
cally solvent taxpayers (i.e. debtors whose total assets exceed their total lia-
bilities) to avoid tax liability despite their ability to pay. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 1999-35-002 (Sept. 3, 1999) (revoking Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-30-005 
(Mar. 29, 1991»; Priv. Ltr. Rul.1999-32-013 (Aug. 13, 1999) (revokingPriv. 
Ltr. Rul. 91-25-010 (Mar. 19, 1991»; Field Service Advice 1999-32-019 (Aug. 
13, 1999); Service Center Advice 1998-039 (Apr. 1, 1998). 
87. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995). 
88. See, e.g., Scholssberb v. Barney, 380 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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by the entirety. A question exists as to whether a tenancy by the en-
tirety interest enhances a taxpayer's ability to pay. 
IV. UNITED STATES V. CRAFF: A SPOUSE'S TENANCY BY THE 
ENTIRE1Y INTEREST CONSTITUTES PROPER1Y OR A 
RIGHT TO PROPER1Y 
In most common law jurisdictions, creditors of one spouse cannot 
seize property (or that debtor-spouse's present interest in the prop-
erty) held as tenants by the entirety.89 In 2002, the Supreme Court 
recognized an exception to this rule in United States v. Craft.90 While 
Craft did not concern § 108, the Court's rationale is instructive in de-
termining whether a tenancy by the entirety interest enhances a 
debtor's ability to pay tax because of the Court's analysis of the various 
property rights inherent in a tenancy by the entirety interest. 
Don Craft failed to file income tax returns for eight years, and, as a 
result, had $482,446 of unpaid income tax. 91 The IRS assessed this 
amount and, after Mr. Craft failed to pay it, the IRS attached a lien on 
"'all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, be-
longing to' him."92 When the lien attached, Mr. Craft and his wife 
owned a parcel of real property in Michigan-a jurisdiction recogniz-
ing the traditional common law incidents of ownership-as tenants by 
the entirety.93 Mter notice of the lien was filed, the Crafts executed a 
quitclaim deed purporting to transfer Mr. Craft's interest in the prop-
erty to his wife for one dollar.94 One year later, Mrs. Craft attempted 
to sell the property and the IRS agreed to release the lien if half of the 
sale proceeds were held in escrow pending resolution of the issue.95 
Mrs. Craft then brought an action to quiet title to the sale pro-
ceeds.96 This action eventually came before the Supreme Court.97 
The Supreme Court held that, although only one spouse owed the 
tax, a federal tax lien could attach to that spouse's tenancy by the 
entirety interest.98 To reach this holding, the Court examined the 
breadth of control either spouse had over the property and concluded 
that they each held "property" or a "right to property" in their inter-
ests.99 The Court examined the state law property rights afforded to 
89. See infra Part V.A (discussing tenancy by the entirety ownership in a tradi-
tional common law jurisdiction). 
90. 535 U.S. 274 (2002). 
91. Id. at 276. 
92. Id. at 275-76 (quoting I.R.C. § 6321 (West 2000)). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 27fr77. 
95. Id. at 277. The IRS never asked for more than half of the proceeds of the 
property titled as tenancy by the entirety. Id. 
96. Id. at 277-78. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 288. 
99. Id. at 282-85. 
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each spouse, describing each spouse's property rights using the com-
mon "bundle of sticks" idiom, whereby each "stick" represents a prop-
erty right. IOO These rights include the right to use the entire property; 
receive income produced by the property; and, in particular, exclude 
others from the property-" 'one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' ,,101 
Although the Court acknowledged that neither spouse alone could 
alienate or encumber the property, nor sever the tenancy without con-
sent of the other spouse or dissolution of the marriage, the Court con-
cluded that these limitations were insufficient to disregard a tenancy 
by the entirety interest as property or a right to property.l02 With the 
tenancy by the entirety interest, the rights of the debtor-spouse "went 
beyond use, exclusion, and income."103 The Court stated that Mr. 
Craft 
also possessed the right to alienate (or otherwise encumber) 
the property with the consent of ... his wife [the non-debtor-
spouse] .... It is true ... that he lacked the right to unilat-
erally alienate the property, a right that is often in the bun-
dle of property rights .... There is no reason to believe, 
however, that this one stick-the right of unilateral aliena-
tion-is essential to the category of "property."104 
The Court looked beyond the aegis of a tenancy by the entirety 
ownership to determine that each spouse had rights to property that, 
while not unfettered, were not illusory. !Os The Court advanced a com-
mon-sense approach that the property belonged to someone. 106 In-
deed, if rights in property titled as tenancy by the entirety held by Mr. 
Craft, the debtor-spouse, do not constitute "property" or "rights to 
property," then the property would belong to no one-Mrs. Craft, the 
non-debtor-spouse, would have 
no more interest in the property than her husband; if 
neither of them had a property interest in the entireties 
property, who did? This result not only seems absurd, but 
would also allow spouses to shield their property from fed-
eral taxation by classifying it as entireties property, facilitat-
ing abuse of the federal tax system. 107 
Finally, the Court recognized the necessity of an expansive reach to 
collect federal taxes because collection of iederal taxes was para-
100. Id. at 278-79. 
101. Id. at 282-83 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 
(1979». 
102. Id. at 288. 
103. Id. at 283. 
104. Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted). 
105. See id. 
106. See id. at 285. 
107. Id. 
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mount; a contrary holding could encourage collusion to avoid 
taxes. 108 
V. TENANCY BY THE ENTIRElY INTERESTS UNDER TRADI-
TIONAL COMMON LAW 
This section first analyzes the rights of a spouse holding a tenancy 
by the entirety interest. The discussion focuses on Maryland law; how-
ever, it applies to jurisdictions that also retain tenancy by the entirety 
ownership in its traditional common law form. Then, in light of the 
ownership of those interests, this section examines whether a tenancy 
by the entirety interest is an asset of one spouse for purposes of § 108. 
A. Incidents oj Ownership ConJerred Under Maryland Law 
In traditional common law jurisdictions such as Maryland, owner-
ship of a tenancy by the entirety interest entitles each spouse to the 
whole property (its entirety), but neither spouse owns the property 
individually.109 One spouse may lease, dispose of, or encumber the 
property only with the consent of the other spouse,110 or after the 
tenancy has been severed by an absolute divorce or death of the other 
spouseYI Upon the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse takes 
the entire estate.112 Each spouse generally has an equal right to in-
come derived from the propertyY3 Finally, a judgment creditor of 
one spouse may not attach a lien to the property during the joint lives 
of the spousesY4 
108. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower courts to value 
the tenancy by the entirety interest. It bears noting, however, that the IRS 
did not attempt to recover more than half of the proceeds from the prop-
erty. See id. at 289. On remand, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Michigan entered a stipulated judgment for the IRS to 
retain $50,293.94 of net sales proceeds from the property. Craft v. United 
States, No. 93-CV-306 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2003). This amount ended up 
being about half of the net proceeds. 
109. State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. 171, 187, 533 A.2d 659, 666-67 
(1987). 
110. Id. at 187, 533 A.2d at 667; Arbesman v. Wilner, 298 Md. 282,290,468 A.2d 
633,637 (1983). 
111. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. at 187, 533 A.2d at 667; Beall v. Beall, 291 
Md. 224, 234, 434 A.2d 1015, 1021 (1981). 
112. Beal~ 291 Md. at 234, 434 A.2d at 1021. 
113. Parsons v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 378, 402 (1964) (interpreting Maryland law); 
Bour v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 237, 240 (1954) (interpreting Maryland law). 
114. See One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. at 187, 533 A.2d at 666-67; Arbesman, 298 
Md. at 289, 468 A.2d at 636. 
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B. Whether a Tenancy by the Entirety Interest Constitutes an Asset Under 
§ 108 
For purposes of § 108, insolvency is the excess of a debtor's liabili-
ties over the fair market value of his or her assets. llS Looking at the 
word "assets" without reference to fair market value, a tenancy by the 
entirety interest should be considered an asset under Carlson and 
Craft. In Carlson, the Tax Court ended the long-standing practice of 
disregarding property protected under state law from creditors' 
claimsY6 This holding opened the door to consider that kind of 
property as an asset when determining insolvency. 
The court in Carlson based its query on what types of property in-
crease a debtor's ability to pay the debt.117 Property owned by both 
spouses, regardless of how it is titled, increases their ability to pay 
when both spouses are obligated-it is additional property from 
which to derive income, to mortgage, and to sell. IIB 
In states retaining the common law incidents of ownership of ten-
ancy by the entirety property, the Supreme Court has held that each 
spouse has property or rights to property.119 The Court reached this 
holding based on each spouse's right to use the property, exclude 
115. I.R.C. § 108( d) (3) (West 2004). 
116. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
118. The tenancy by the entirety conundrum arises only when the debt is owed 
by one spouse (alone), regardless of whether the spouses filed a joint re-
turn. When a husband and wife file ajoint return, their tax is computed on 
the aggregate income of the couple; they are both jointly and severally lia-
ble for the collection of tax. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (West 2004); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6013-4(b) (2002). Filing ajoint return does not create a new tax 
personality-assets and liabilities owned by the individual spouses are not 
combined to become assets of the marital unit. Cj Coever v. Comm'r, 36 
T.e. 252, 254 (1961) (disregarding the idea that a new tax personality is 
created when spouses file jointly). 
Insolvency under § 108 is determined by reference to the extent to 
which the debtor's assets are freed as a result of the discharge. See Carlson 
v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 87, 98-99 (2001); Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 463, 473-
75 & n.7 (1997); cj United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1,3 (1931). 
To determine whether assets are freed, a debtor's ability to pay must be 
enhanced as a result of the discharged debt. Had the debt discharged been 
jointly owned by the spouses, no assets jointly owned would be protected 
under state law from creditors' claims, as it is generally accepted that a 
judgment lien can attach to tenancy by the entirety property if both spouses 
owe the debt. The IRS reached a similar conclusion in a Private Letter 
Ruling in which it concluded that when determining whether a debtor-
spouse was insolvent under § 108, the separate property of the non-debtor-
spouse was not an asset when determining his insolvency because his 
spouse's assets were her own, even if they filed ajoint tax return. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 89-20-019 (May 19, 1989). 
119. See supra Parts IV and V.A (discussing tenancy by the entirety property), 
Part IV (discussing Craft). 
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others from the property, dispose of the property, and encumber the 
property (with consent of the other spouse).120 
At a minimum, the survivorship interest of each spouse enhances 
that spouse's ability to pay.121 As a practical matter, the other inci-
dents of ownership (i.e., exclusion, alienation, and encumbrance) 
also enhance a spouse's ability to pay. This is because, in most circum-
stances, spouses act in concert to advance what is in their best interest. 
Joint action with regard to tenancy by the entirety property is one way 
to advance that interest: spouses can encumber their combined inter-
est, sell their combined interest, or both, or refuse to do either. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the inability of one spouse to uni-
laterally encumber property is not a significant restriction on the 
property that would undermine each spouse's other rights.122 There-
fore, the incidents of ownership in a tenancy by the entirety interest 
enhance one spouse's ability to pay. 
This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's analysis in 
Craft.123 Acting with the other spouse, the debtor-spouse may encum-
ber or sell the property, or both.124 Selling and/or encumbering the 
property gives a debtor more resources to repay the debt. Failing to 
recognize this increased ability to pay would allow spouses to shield 
their property from federal taxation, something the Supreme Court 
recognized would facilitate abuse of the federal tax system. 125 More-
over, the Supreme Court recognized that the requirement of joint 
spousal action regarding a tenancy by the entirety interest is an incon-
sequential limitation. 126 
For purposes of the § 108 exclusion, insolvency is the extent that 
liabilities exceed the fair market value of a debtor's assets.127 If "as-
sets" refers only to those with a fair market value, then a tenancy by 
the entirety interest can never be an asset because there is no market 
for the interest-only a spouse can hold a tenancy by the entirety in-
terest with the other spouse-therefore, there can be no fair market 
value. 128 
This syllogistic reasoning unduly focuses on the form of the prop-
erty interest, not the substantive right created thereunder, and ig-
nores the Supreme Court's analysis of a tenancy by the entirety 
120. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of a 
tenant by the entirety as set forth in Craft). 
121. Cf In re Ryan, 282 B.R 742, 748 (Bankr. D.R.1. 2002). One spouse's survi-
vorship interest is generally recognized as an alienable interest with a value, 
albeit speculative. Id. 
122. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
123. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra notes103-04 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
127. I.R.C. § 108( d) (3) (West 2004). 
128. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 281 (2002). 
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interest in relation to the collection of federal income tax. I29 Further, 
this argument fails to recognize that there is a market for the underly-
ing property, and for either spouse's contingent survivorship inter-
est. I30 Also, failure to acknowledge that spouses, by acting in their 
best interest, can either shield assets from creditors or make them 
available to sell or to encumber ignores the economic reality of the 
property rights-and the resulting availability to pay a debt-inherent 
in tenancy by the entirety ownership.I31 Finally, as discussed more 
fully in the following sections, even looking at the definition of assets 
only as those having an actual fair market value, tenancy by the en-
tirety interests-both the present and future survivorship interests-
should be deemed to have a fair market value based on how they are 
valued for other purposes of the Code, by courts, and by the IRS. I32 
Where exclusion of a tenancy by the entirety interest would increase 
the tax benefit being conferred (as with the § 108 insolvency exclu-
sion), the tenancy by the entirety interest should be considered as an 
asset. Ownership of a tenancy by the entirety interest does increase a 
debtor's ability to pay tax-despite its strictures, it is a bona fide prop-
erty interest. Moreover, consideration of a tenancy by the entirety in-
terest is consistent with the judicial maxim that exclusions from 
income are to be narrowly construed. I33 Failure to consider the inter-
est would reduce the taxpayer's solvency, resulting in the exclusion 
from taxation of a greater portion of the discharged debt. I34 
Because a debtor-spouse owns the underlying property as a party to 
a marriage, the value of his or her tenancy by the entirety interest 
should be limited. Any valuation of the interest should give appropri-
ate consideration to the non-debtor-spouse's interest, as well as con-
template factors that otherwise affect the value of either spouse's 
interest, such as the impact of divorce and death. 
129. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
130. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
132. See infra notes 139-66 and accompanying text (discussing how courts value a 
tenancy by the entirety interest in bankruptcy proceedings); notes 177-84 
and accompanying text (discussing how courts consider a tenancy by the 
entirety interest in a marital dissolution proceeding); notes 172-76 and ac-
companying text (discussing how a tenancy by the entirety interest is con-
sidered for estate tax purposes); notes 167-71 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the IRS values a tenancy by the entirety interest in 
collections) . 
133. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
134. See United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 582 (1991). 
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VI. FAIR MARKET VALUE OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRE1Y IN-
TEREST TO DETERMINE INSOLVENCY 
A. Fair Market Value oj Debtor's Interest in Tenancy by the Entirety Property 
Insolvency is calculated by subtracting a debtor's liabilities from the 
fair market value of his or her assets. 135 Fair market value is the price 
that a hypothetical willing buyer would pay, and a hypothetical willing 
seller would receive, for property.136 For this purpose, the property is 
valued at its highest and best use and without regard to events occur-
ring subsequent to the valuation date, to the extent that those subse-
quent events were not reasonably foreseeable. 137 Determining fair 
market value requires a factual inquiry, whereby all relevant evidence 
is weighed and appropriate inferences are drawn. 138 
B. Application oJCraft to Determine the Value oj a Tenancy by the Entirety 
Interest 
In several recent bankruptcy proceedings, courts have answered 
Craft's unanswered question: How should a spouse's tenancy by the 
entirety interest be valued? All courts deciding the issue have consid-
ered the incidents of ownership associated with the interest in the ap-
plicable jurisdiction. Depending on the purpose of the valuation (i.e., 
replacement value versus another value), courts are split regarding 
whether the value of one spouse's interest in tenancy by the entirety 
property should be adjusted further to account for each spouse's sepa-
rate survivorship interest in cases concerning a debtor's federal tax 
obligation. 
For example, in Popky v. United States,139 a federal district court in 
Pennsylvania held that a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety inter-
est under Pennsylvania law was half the value of the underlying prop-
erty.l40 In that case, the IRS assessed $42,799.20 of unpaid 
employment taxes owed by the debtor-spouse, Sheila Popky.141 Four 
years later, Mrs. Popky and her husband sold the property-titled as 
tenants by the entirety-that was subject to an IRS lien. 142 After the 
title company sent the IRS a check for $42,324.43, the Popkys initiated 
a suit to quiet title to proceeds from the sale of property.143 
The first issue the court decided was whether, under Pennsylvania 
law, the tenancy by the entirety property held by Dr. and Mrs. Popky 
135. I.R.C. § 108 ( d) (3) (West 2004). 
136. See Kolom v. Comm'r, 454 U.S. 1011, 1013 (1981); Bank One Corp. v. 
Comm'r, 120 T.e. 174,306 (2003). 
137. Bank One Corp., 120 T.C. at 306. 
138. Id. 
139. 326 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
140. Id. at 603. 
141. Id. at 597. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 596. 
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could be subject to a federal tax lien where the tax was owed by only 
one spouse. 144 Mter holding that the lien could attach to Mrs. 
Popky's tenancy by the entirety interest, the court assigned a value to 
the interest. 145 At the onset, the court recognized that under Penn-
sylvania law, while the Popkys were married, neither Mrs. Popky nor 
Dr. Popky could destroy the tenancy or alienate any portion of it with-
out the consent of the other. 146 On one hand, the court recognized 
that equal division of the entireties property "fails to account for the 
differing life expectancies of the spouses and ... the probability that 
either spouse will ultimately have a right to the whole."147 On the 
other hand, the court also recognized that consideration of the survi-
vorship interests of the spouses relies 
on a speculative prediction that both spouses will have an 
average life span and it neither accounts for the health of the 
spouses nor for the likelihood of divorce or a sale of the 
property with the consent of both spouses which could break 
up the tenancy by the entireties. To include these factors 
would make valuation infinitely more complicated and 
would again reach a valuation based merely on 
speculation. 148 
The court held that the "only equitable solution" was to value Mrs. 
Popky's tenancy by the entirety interest at half the net value of the 
underlying asset. 149 
Similarly, in In re Gallivan,150 a federal bankruptcy court deter-
mined the value of each spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest for 
purposes of a secured claim by the IRS against one spouse. 151 The 
debtors were husband and wife, Jerry and Jeanette Gallivan, who filed 
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 152 Prior to the filing, Mr. Gallivan 
was the sole proprietor of a trucking company that failed to pay em-
ployment tax. 153 The IRS filed pre-petition notices of tax liens and a 
proof of claim (with both secured and unsecured components) re-
garding Mr. Gallivan's employment tax. 154 
144. [d. at 597. 
145. [d. at 601,603. 
146. [d. at 601. 
147. [d. at 602-03. 
148. [d. at 603. 
149. [d. The court's decision in Popky was based in part on a Pennsylvania stat-
ute that provides that if tenancy by the entirety property is not otherwise 
divided by court order in a marital dissolution proceeding, then, upon di-
vorce, each spouse holds half of the interest as tenant in common with the 
other spouse. [d. at 600 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3507(a) (West 
2001) ). 
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The Gallivans argued that the amount of Mr. Gallivan's tenancy by 
the entirety interest, and therefore the amount of the IRS's claim, 
should be reduced based on Mr. Gallivan's life expectancy.I55 The 
IRS countered that the value of Mr. Gallivan's tenancy by the entirety 
interest should be half the net value of the underlying asset. 156 
The court rejected the debtor's argument that the value of each 
spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest should be adjusted to account 
for the life expectancies of the spouses, presumably to follow the 
trend of other courts, stating that survivorship principles were not "en-
tirely applicable in the bankruptcy context" because the extent of the 
IRS's lien must be determined before a bankruptcy plan of reorgani-
zation could be confirmed.157 Once confirmed, the IRS's lien would 
not be increased if Mrs. Gallivan were to later predecease Mr. Gal-
livan.158 The court held that an equal division of the interests seemed 
equitable; it paralleled the distribution of the property after an entire-
ties estate is severed due to a sale, divorce, or some other reason.159 
Further, the court concluded that the spouses have a "unity of inter-
est, unity of entirety, unity of time, and unity of possession;" therefore, 
they must each hold an equal interest. 160 
While the foregoing cases have held that a debtor-spouse's tenancy 
by the entirety interest is half the net value of the underlying property, 
courts considering the replacement value, and not the fair market value, 
of the property have held differently.161 For example, the District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the replacement 
value of a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest should re-
flect his life expectancy, citing federal estate tax regulations that value 
life estates using actuarial tables. 162 The court held that "[d]espite its 
administrative inconvenience, ... the value of a debtor's interest in 
tenancy by the entireties property must be determined by joint life 
actuarial tables" although using actuarial tables "invites speculation 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 665-66 (citing In reGarner, 952 F.2d 232, 236 (8th Cir. 1991); Popkyv. 
United States, 326 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2004». 
158. In re Gallivan, 312 B.R. at 665. 
159. Id. (citing Popky, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 602). The court's statement that equal 
division of interests parallels the distribution of tenancy by the entirety in-
terest after divorce may be inaccurate. As support for this statement, the 
court in Gallivan relies in part in Popky. See supra notes 139-49 and accompa-
nying text. Although the court in Popky did state that a tenancy by the en-
tirety state is divided equally between spouses upon divorce, the court was 
relying on a specific Pennsylvania statute. See supra note 149. 
160. Id. 
161. Replacement value is "the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, business, 
or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain property of like age and 
condition." Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 959 n.2 
(1997) (emphasis added). 
162. In re Murray, 318 B.R. 211, 214 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004). 
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about the future and is administratively less convenient" than valuing 
the debtor-spouse's interest at half the underlying asset value. 163 
In another case, In re Basher,164 the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also held that the replacement 
value of a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest was affected 
by each spouse's respective life expectancies because their rights of 
survivorship altered their otherwise equal interests.165 While these 
courts' analyses are informative, they should not control in determin-
ing the value of property for purposes of insolvency because the value 
of assets for insolvency is determined by reference to fair market 
value, which may differ from replacement value.166 
C. Value Used In IRS Collection Proceedings 
The IRS considers the purpose for the valuation when determining 
the value of the underlying asset. For purposes of imposing a federal 
tax lien, as well as valuing a secured claim in bankruptcy, the IRS 
deems a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest to be half of 
the net equity in the underlying property. 167 Similarly, in private fore-
closure actions, the IRS deems a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the en-
tirety interest to be half of the difference between the value of the 
property and the amount of the senior lien. 168 
In evaluating an offer in compromise for doubt as to collectibility 
under § 7122, the IRS generally values a debtor-spouse's tenancy by 
the entirety interest at half of the net equity in the underlying prop-
erty.169 However, the IRS has routinely recognized that it can be as 
low as twenty percent if the non-debtor-spouse paid substantially all of 
the purchase price or mortgage payments, or if the non-debtor-spouse 
163. [d. 
164. 291 B.R. 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003). 
165. [d. at 362, 364, 366. In Pletz v. United States, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a 
decision by a bankruptcy court, in which the bankruptcy court consulted 
actuarial tables to value one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest. 221 
F.3d 1114,1118-19 (9th Cir. 2000). It is important to note that in Pletz, the 
underlying property being valued was situated in Oregon, where under 
state law, creditors of one spouse can attach that spouse's interest. [d. at 
1117. 
166. See, e.g., McGuire v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 801, 806 (1965) (noting the taxpayers' 
concession that replacement value may exceed fair market value); Under-
wood v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 731 (1989) (recognizing that replace-
ment value can enhance the fair market value of a used asset); Livingston v. 
Comm'r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 277 (1966) (recognizing that replacement value 
is not a reliable indicator of fair market value but is worthy of consideration 
for a new building); Himes v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 515 (1949) (recog-
nizing that the cost to replace a machine is not the proper basis for deter-
mining fair market value). 
167. I.R.S. Notice 2003-60, 2003-2 C.B. 643. 
168. [d. 
169. I.R.M. 5.8.5.3.11(4) (Nov. 1,2000). 
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refuses to commit the property for sale or for collateral on a loan to 
help pay the offer. 170 
While the IRS's valuation of a tenancy by the entirety interest in 
bankruptcy proceedings and administrative settlements is not disposi-
tive in determining valuation under § 108, it is instructive because the 
IRS will always be a party to litigation resulting from an incorrect in-
solvency determination. Therefore, a debtor can make a tenable ar-
gument that a valuation approach different from these may be 
contrary to the IRS's published guidance and prior litigating 
positions. 1 71 
D. Value of One Spouse's Tenancy by Entirety Interest for Estate Tax 
Purposes 
In at least one instance, the Code expressly prescribes that the fair 
market value of one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest is half of 
the underlying property's value. In § 2040(b), an estate tax provision, 
half the value of property owned as tenancy by the entirety by a dece-
dent and his or her spouse is included in the decedent's gross es-
tate. 172 This valuation rule was intended to facilitate administration of 
the estate, and it applies regardless of which spouse paid the consider-
ation for the property.173 
The express language in § 2040 (b) both favors and disfavors valu-
ing a tenancy by the entirety interest as half the underlying property's 
net value for purposes of § 108. On one hand, the statutorily pre-
scribed valuation method supports the conclusion that halving the un-
derlying property's net value is a reasonable method of determining a 
fair market value for the interest. 174 On the other hand, the express 
provision in § 2040(b), compared to the absence of similar language 
in § 108, supports the conclusion that Congress intentionally omitted 







Id. The IRS revised this provision of the Internal Revenue Manual on No-
vember 15, 2004 to eliminate the twenty-percent valuation. LRM. 
5.8.5.3.11(4) (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ 
ch08s05.html. The IRS generally does not consider assets of the non-
debtor-spouse in determining whether an offer is adequate unless applica-
ble state law permits the non-liable spouse's assets to be collected. Treas. 
Reg. § 301. 7122-1 (c)(2) (ii)(A) (2002). Even if state law allows collection, 
the assets are considered only to the extent that collection of those assets 
would not materially and adversely affect the family's standard of living. Id. 
at § 301.7122-1 (c)(2) (ii)(B). 
C! Rauenhorst v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157, 170-72 (2002) (rejecting argu-
ments advanced by the IRS that contradict its published rulings of general 
application that have not been modified or withdrawn). 
LRC. § 2040(b) (West 2004). 
Hahn v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 140 (1998) (citing H.R Rep. No. 97-201, at 160 
(1981); S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 126-27 (1981)). 
2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 53:03 
(6th ed. 2000). 
See id. § 51:02. 
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factual and should only be uniform where the facts dictate. Moreover, 
analogous but unrelated legislation is often an unreliable means of 
discerning legislative intent. 176 Therefore, the use of § 2040 (b) to 
value a tenancy by the entirety interest for other purposes should only 
occur when § 2040(b),s valuation method is endorsed expressly by 
Congress. 
E. Treatment of Tenancy by the Entirety Interests in Marital Dissolution 
Proceedings 
In marital dissolution proceedings in common law jurisdictions, 
property is distributed either equitably or equally.I77 For example, 
Maryland is an equitable distribution state, which means that in mari-
tal dissolution proceedings, a court has discretion to award or appor-
tion marital property between spouses as it deems equitable, just, and 
reasonable-but not necessarily equally.178 Marital property includes 
property titled as tenants by the entirety.179 When awarding marital 
property, a Maryland court cannot transfer ownership between 
spouses; it may only make an adjustment in the form of a monetary 
award. I80 The amount of the monetary award is based on the follow-
ing statutorily prescribed factors: 
(1) the contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of each 
party to the well-being of the family; 
(2) the value of all property interests of each party; 
176. Id. § 53:05. 
177. See Equal Versus Equitable: The Issue of Equal Division, 15 No.3 EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION J. 25 (1998). In equal distribution states (e.g., New Hamp-
shire), there is a strong presumption in favor of equal distributions of mari-
tal property. Id. at 26-28. In equitable distribution states (e.g., Hawaii, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyo-
ming), there is no presumption favoring equal distribution. Id. at 27. In 
hybrid-distribution states (e.g., Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin), courts will begin with a pre-
sumption that marital property shall be divided in half, but then each 
spouse's respective value should be adjusted if the equities dictate. Id. at 
26-27. 
178. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 508-09, 629 A.2d 70, 76 (1993) ("In Mary-
land, as in the majority of equitable distribution states, 'equitable' does not 
necessarily mean 'equaL"'). 
179. MD. CODE.~NN., FAM. LAw § 8-201 (e) (2004). If property is acquired before 
a marriage but title is changed to tenancy by the entirety after the marriage, 
the portion of the property paid for prior to the marriage is not marital 
property. Kline v. Kline, 85 Md. App. 28, 40-41, 581 A.2d 1300, 1306 
(1990). 
180. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-202 (a) (3) (2004) ("[TJhe court may not 
transfer the ownership of ... real property from one party to the other."); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-205(a) (stating that "[aJfter the court deter-
mines which property is marital property, and the value of marital property, 
the court may ... grant a monetary award ... as an adjustment of the 
equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or 
not alimony is awarded"). 
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(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time 
the award is to be made; 
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement 
of the parties; 
(5) the duration of the marriage; 
(6) the age of each party; 
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party; 
(8) how and when specific marital property . . . was ac-
quired, including the effort expended by each party in ac-
cumulating the marital property ... ; 
(9) the contribution by either party of . . . [non-marital] 
property to the acquisition of real property held by the par-
ties as tenants by the entirety; 
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision 
that the court has made with respect to family use personal 
property or the family home; and 
(11) any other factor the court considers necessary or ap-
propriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equita-
ble monetary award.18I 
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Each and all of the foregoing factors could affect the value of a 
spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest in Maryland after an absolute 
divorce, particularly the manner in which the tenancy by the entirety 
property was acquired and the extent to which it was acquired with 
non-marital property. 
Mter applying these factors, a court could grant one spouse the en-
tire value of the tenancy by the entirety property or none of it. 182 
These factors are an express recognition by the Maryland General As-
sembly that courts are to look at all of the facts and circumstances 
before assigning a value to each spouse's interest in the underlying 
property. This valuation approach seems reasonable and, indeed nec-
essary.183 Not only is each property unique,184 the contributions to 
acquire and maintain property can vary greatly. Although there is no 
market per se for a tenancy by the entirety interest, the multitude of 
factors used by Maryland and other states to determine a fair market 
value for the tenancy by the entirety interest in a divorce proceeding 
181. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-205(b). 
182. See Alston, 331 Md. at 508, 629 A.2d at 76. 
183. Id. at 506-07, 629 A.2d at 75. 
184. The fact that land is unique is supported by the fact that specific perform-
ance, an equitable remedy, is preferred over an award of damages with re-
gard to realty. See, e.g., Leet v. Totah, 329 Md. 645, 665, 620 A.2d 1372, 
1381-82 (1993) (clarifYing that specific performance is an available remedy 
for purchase of realty); Manning v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 230 Md. 415, 
422, 187 A.2d 468, 472 (1963) (granting specific performance for realty); 
Archway Motors Inc. v. Herman, 37 Md. App. 674, 682, 378 A.2d 702, 725 
(1977) (recognizing that "specific performance is not only available but a 
preferred remedy to a contract seller of land is firmly rooted in the law of 
Maryland") . 
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appears to replicate what a willing buyer and a willing seller would 
consider in valuing property. 
VII. PROPOSED VALUATION OF A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRE1Y 
INTEREST UNDER MARYLAND lAW 
Since United States v. Craft, federal courts have generally valued a 
tenancy by the entirety interest for purposes of a federal tax lien at 
half the net value of the underlying property.185 These courts use half 
the value because the lien immediately encumbers the debtor-
spouse's interest, which eliminates speculation regarding the effect of 
death or a possible divorce.186 Beginning the valuation at half the net 
value of the underlying property is also consistent with the general 
approach of the IRS. 187 
This approach offers simplicity in a tax system based on self-assess-
ment, whereby taxpayers are responsible for initially reporting their 
taxes. This simplicity is particularly important where property laws of 
each state could afford different rights and impose different restrict-
ions on tenancy by the entirety ownership, and where tax parity be-
tween common law and community property jurisdictions is a goal. 
This starting point is also consistent with, but not motivated by, the 
valuation approach in § 2040 (b). 
From this point, one spouse's interest should be adjusted based on 
equitable distribution factors enumerated under state law in marital 
dissolution proceedings, in which the tenancy is severed and each 
spouse's interest is valued. The adjustment results because Maryland 
(and many other states) has specifically recognized that each spouse's 
interest in marital property, including tenancy by the entirety inter-
ests, may not necessarily be equal. 188 As explained above, if one 
spouse demonstrates an overwhelming existence of any of the mone-
tary award factors, then a Maryland court is likely to give that spouse 
an award that represents a much greater, if not entire, interest in the 
property.189 The reverse is also true: if the other spouse can demon-
strate the overwhelming existence of any of the factors, then the other 
spouse's award should be greater. Therefore, it should follow that if a 
debtor-spouse can demonstrate the non-debtor-spouse's hypothetical 
award would be greater, then the debtor-spouse's value in the tenancy 
by the entirety interest should be reduced for purposes of determin-
ing insolvency under § 108. Consideration of these factors is consis-
tent with the IRS's willingness to adjust valuation of a tenancy by the 
entirety interest (in some cases calculating the value as low as twenty 
percent of the net value of the underlying property) when consider-
185. See supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text. 
186. See, e.g., supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. 
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ing offers in compromise. 190 In applying this approach, it is critical 
that the debtor-spouse remember that he or she bears the burden of 
proof to establish valuation, and therefore the factors to support the 
valuation, regardless of judicial forum. 191 
Under state property law, each spouse's survivorship interest is the 
only consistent difference between the tenancy by the entirety inter-
ests held by each spouse that may cause a significant difference in the 
value of the interest between spouses. If a debtor-spouse can demon-
strate an appreciable difference in life expectancies that would affect 
the value of his or her survivorship interest, then that difference 
should also be considered. As in most bankruptcy cases addressing 
the issue, routine consideration of life expectancies would make valua-
tion more complicated and based largely on speculation, particularly 
because in the average case, any difference in value attributable to life 
expectancies is likely negligible. 192 Therefore, this factor should af-
fect the valuation only when, based on the facts and circumstances, 
there is an appreciable difference in life expectancies that may yield 
an appreciable difference in the valuation. 
Applying this approach to our example,193 if Paul provided all of 
the funds for the house he owns with Mary (and that can be proven), 
the entire value of the underlying property should be considered as 
an asset when determining whether he is insolvent. Therefore, his 
assets of $360,000 would exceed his liabilities of $250,000 by $110,000, 
which means that he would be solvent and the $100,000 of discharged 
debt would be includible in his gross income. If, however, Paul could 
demonstrate that the house was purchased entirely with Mary's sepa-
rate, non-marital funds (for example, with money devised only to 
her), then none of the value of the house should be considered his 
asset because, were they to get a divorce, he ,,'ould likely not receive 
any interest in the property. Thus, Paul would be insolvent to the 
extent of $190,000, the amount that his liabilities of $250,000 exceed 
the fair market value of his assets of $60,000. Similarly, if Paul were 
much older than Mary, then a court may reduce the value of his ten-
ancy by the entirety interest to account for his small survivorship 
interest. 
190. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
191. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7491 (West 2004) (imposing the initial burden on the tax-
payer to introduce credible evidence in court proceedings arising in con-
nection with examinations by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue); 
United States v.Janus, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976) ("In a refund suit the tax-
payer bears the burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover."); 
Higbee v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 438, 440-41 (2001) (recognizing the burden of 
proof is on the taxpayer in a deficiency case); see also TAX CT. R. 142. 
192. See supra notes 147-49, 157-59 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the precedent of the Supreme Court and the United 
States Tax Court, a tenancy by the entirety interest in a traditional 
common law jurisdiction, such as Maryland, should be considered an 
asset for purposes of determining the insolvency of one spouse under 
§ 108. Consistent with the Tax Court's opinion in Carlson v. Commis-
sioner, courts should look behind the veil of tenancy by the entirety 
ownership to determine whether property affords the debtor-spouse 
an enhanced ability to pay.194 Based on the rationale of the Supreme 
Court in Craft, along with the methods employed by other courts and 
the IRS, valuation of a tenancy by the entirety interest should begin at 
half the net value of the underlying property.l95 The value should 
then be adjusted to reflect special circumstances, such as a de minimus 
contribution by the debtor-spouse to the acquisition of the property 
or an extraordinary difference in the spouses' life expectancies. 
Throughout, the burden of proof to show these special circumstances 
exist would be on the proponent, who is most likely the debtor-
spouse. 
194. See supra Part III. 
195. See supra Parts IV-VI. 
